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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
One approach considered by policy-makers and regulators as part of the 
process of opening up postal markets has been to encourage access by 
entrants to the postal facilities of the universal service provider (USP). In 
this paper we build on previous work on access pricing set out in De Donder 
et al (2003).1  We focus again on identifying pricing rules for access to a 
USP’s delivery network where the rules are optimal or welfare-maximising 
and so of the type of a regulator charged with regulating access would wish 
to set. The USP is required to offer access at these prices while at the same 
time providing universal postal service at a uniform tariff and continuing to 
break-even (including a normal rate of return on capital).  
The main difference with De Donder et al (2003) is that we endogeneize 
the USP uniform retail price that was previously exogenously fixed. Our 
main objective here is to assess whether the results obtained earlier are 
robust to the introduction of this new instrument. The main results are the 
following ones: 
- Optimal access charges are given by a second best ECPR rule, 
modified to take account of both the proportion of mail displaced from 
the USP to the entrant (as opposed to newly generated by the entrant) 
and of the necessity for the USP to raise money to cover its fixed 
costs. 
- The optimal access charge is affected directly by the optimal uniform 
retail price. 
- If bypass is not available to entrants, all consumers benefit from entry 
while the USP manages to use both the access charges and retail price 
in an optimal way to cover its fixed costs and break even. 
- If optimal access charges are higher than the entrant’s delivery cost, 
the entrant would prefer bypass to access to the USP delivery network. 
In our simulations we examine the likeliest case for entrant bypass; 
namely that it occurs on the urban area but entrants prefer to deliver by 
use of access to the USP’s network in rural areas. This case of urban 
bypass and rural access does not allow the USP to break even 
anymore.  
- The optimal uniform retail price is generally not the same as the break-
even uniform price under monopoly prior to entry. The paper uses 
simulations to show that in some cases the uniform retail price is lower 
and in others it is higher than under monopoly. The optimal uniform 
                                                 
1 Other recent papers on access pricing issues in the postal sector include those by 
Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), De Donder et al (2002b) and Panzar (2002). 
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retail price tends to be lower where entry is only through access to the 
USP’s delivery network and higher when entry can also be through 
bypass. 
- The effect on total welfare of urban bypass coupled with rural access 
depends on specific circumstances. In the calibration model, we find 
that welfare will tend to increase the greater the underlying 
attractiveness of entrants’ services and the more the traffic they carry 
is newly generated. At the same time total welfare is lower where 
bypass is possible than in the case where only access but not bypass is 
available to entrants and also, in most cases, than under monopoly. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly sets out the 
basic model and section 3 derives the optimal access charges and USP retail 
price from the model. The elements of the model have been reduced to a 
minimum in order to try to identify policy insights into potentially a highly 
complex problem. To aid this, section 4 reports some illustrative numerical 
results based on a calibration reported in De Donder et al (2002a). Section 5 
concludes by highlighting the main insights from the development of the 
model previously set out in De Donder et al (2003). 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
There are two postal operators: the universal service provider (USP) and 
an entrant which acts as a competitive fringe. The USP offers a single 
product (average mail) which can be sent to the rural or to the urban area. 
The USP has to serve both markets at a uniform price. The entrant is not 
subject to a uniform service obligation and chooses which market (urban 
and/or rural) to serve and at which price. One representative consumer sends 
letters to both areas (or markets). We assume that the two markets are 
independent (the prices on one area do not affect the number of letters sent 
to the other area) and that the services offered by the two operators are 
(imperfect) substitutes on any given market, so that an increase in one 
operator’s price in one market increases the quantity sold by the other 
operator on the same market.  
The USP delivers its letters on both markets while the entrant can choose 
whether to deliver itself or to ask access to the USP’s delivery network. The 
entrant will deliver itself if its delivery cost is (strictly) lower than the access 
charge. Moreover, if the access charge is higher than the full retail price of 
the USP, the entrant will always prefer remailing its letters through the USP 
rather than asking for access. We study the optimal access charges and USP 
retail price given these constraints. 
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We now introduce the notation used in the paper. We denote by an 
upperscript I variables pertaining to the USP and by E to the entrant. We use 
the lowerscript U for the urban market and R for the rural market. We denote 
by ijq the demand for mail addressed to operator { }EIi ,∈  for delivery in 
area { }RUj ,∈ . The universal service obligation translates into a global 
fixed cost for the USP, which is denoted by F. The USP uniform retail price 
is denoted by p. We separate the postal activity into two segments: one for 
collection-sorting-transportation and a second for delivery. Both operators 
are active on the first segment. Their (constant) marginal cost is 
{ }EIici ,, ∈  respectively. Operator i’s constant marginal cost of delivery to 
area j is denoted by { } { }RUjEIid ij ,,,, ∈∈ . The entrant does not face a 
fixed cost but has a higher marginal delivery cost than the USP on both 
markets.2 The USP charges a constant unit access price of ja  for each letter 
that the entrant asks the USP to deliver to area { }RUj ,∈ 3. Ejz measures the 
number of letters effectively delivered by the entrant in area { }RUj ,∈ , so 
that Ej
E
j zq −  gives the amount of access to area { }RUj ,∈  sold by the USP 
to the entrant.  
The USP’s profit is given by  
 ( )( )
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where the first line gives the profit made on the letters addressed to the USP 
and the second line is the profit made on selling access. Entrant’s profit is 
given by  ( ) ( )
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2 This can be due to the fact that the entrant has a different technology than the 
incumbent. Moreover, the marginal costs used here are long run marginal costs, 
which include many things which one may consider as 'fixed costs' from an 
accounting perspective. 
3 It would be straightforward to include also an explicit acceptance or metering 
charge incurred by the USP in providing access, as in Crew and Kleindorfer(2002). 
Such a charge enters the results below in the expected way and has been excluded 
from the discussion here to simplify the model. 
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with { }RUjqz EjEj ,,0 ∈≤≤  and { }RUjpa j ,, ∈≤ . Maximisation of 
entrant’s profit gives that 
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that is, that the entrant delivers itself only if it is strictly cheaper to do so 
rather than to ask access. We assume that the entrant acts as a competitive 
fringe i.e. that any positive profit made by the entrant would attract new 
competitors until prices are driven down to average (and marginal) costs. In 
other words, the entrant uses marginal cost pricing and we have ( ).,min jEjEEj adc p +=  
Total welfare W is the sum of postal operators’ profits and consumer 
surpluses. We look for the optimal access charges and USP retail price, i.e. 
access charges Ua , Ra and price p that simultaneously maximise total 
welfare W under the constraint that the USP profit is non-negative ( 0≥Π I ) 
and that { }RUjpa j ,, ∈≤ . 
 
3. OPTIMAL ACCESS CHARGES AND USP RETAIL PRICE 
 
To find the optimal access charges and USP retail price, we differentiate 
total welfare with respect to these three prices. Note first that the access 
charge does not play any role when it is greater than the entrant’s delivery 
cost, in which case the entrant bypasses the USP’s network and delivers the 
mail itself. We thus concentrate on the case where .Ejj da ≤  We also make 
the assumption (reflected in our calibration results) that the optimal access 
charge is less than the USP retail price in both markets: { }RUjpa j ,, ∈≤ . 
In this case, Ej
EE
j
E
j acpz +== ,0 and the first-order condition for the 
optimal value of ja  is given by  
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where λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the USP’s budget 
constraint. 
 Similarly, the optimal value of the USP retail price is obtained from 
the following first order condition 
( ) ( ) ( )
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In order to get a better understanding of the meaning of these equations, 
we first assume that 0=λ , i.e. that the USP’s profit constraint is not 
binding (because of the absence of fixed costs or of the availability of an 
external non-distortionary funding source). We then obtain 
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for the optimum access charge in area j={U,R} and 
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for the optimum retail price. 
 
We first discuss the optimal access charge as given by equation (1). 
With the competitive fringe assumption, increasing the access charge to area 
j results in an increase by the same amount of the entrant’s price in that area. 
This increase in turn affects both the entrant’s and the USP’s quantity on that 
market. To obtain the impact on welfare, one has to multiply the effects on 
quantities by the difference between price and marginal cost of the good 
supplied. The USP supplies two goods: a final good (the letter it delivers to 
area j) and an intermediate good (access to area j for the entrant). The reason 
why the final good sold by entrant does not enter into the formula is because 
it is, by definition of a competitive fringe, sold at marginal cost. 
A first consequence of formula (1) is that first best access pricing 
( Ijj da = ) is only called for when the letter price is set at its first best level 
I
j
I dcp += . Unfortunately, the uniform pricing constraint prevents this 
from happening simultaneously on the urban and rural markets when 
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I
R
I
U dd ≠ . If the letter price is not set at its first-best level, the access price 
formula can be rewritten as 
 ( ) jIjIIjj dcpda σ−−+=                      (1’) 
 
where E
j
E
j
E
j
I
j
j pq
pq
∂∂
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−=
/
/
σ  is the displacement ratio which measures the 
substitutability between USP's and entrant's products on market j, i.e. by how 
much the USP's demand decreases when the entrant supplies one more unit 
of retail service in this market. Multiplying this displacement ratio by the 
difference between the letter price and its marginal cost, one obtains the 
USP's lost profit on the retail market caused by providing access. This is thus 
an ECPR formula, which compensates the USP for the opportunity cost in 
terms of foregone profit (and hence contribution towards the network cost of 
providing universal service) of any traffic lost to the entrant (see Armstrong, 
2002).4 
We now turn to equation (2) which determines the optimal value of the 
retail price p. There are four markets where p affects quantities: two final 
good markets (the selling of USP letters to the urban and the rural areas) and 
two intermediate good markets (providing access to urban and rural areas for 
the entrant). On each market, the impact of p on welfare is the product of the 
effect of p on quantities sold by the difference between price and marginal 
costs. Here also, we see that, because of the uniformity of the USP price, it is 
impossible that both access charges be equal to marginal cost when IR
I
U dd ≠  
We now look at the simultaneous determination of access charges and 
retail price. Using (1’) in (2), we reformulate the expression for the optimal p 
as 
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4 One can also show that the part of the access charge that is above the marginal cost 
of giving access is equal to the second-best output tax on the entrant. The intuition 
for this tax is the following: if the USP's letter price is above marginal cost, the 
quantity produced is too low from a social welfare viewpoint. To raise this quantity, 
the welfare maximiser's only available instrument is the access charge paid by the 
entrant. Increasing this charge results in an increase in the entrant's letter price, 
which in turn increases the number of letters sold by the USP in the same market, 
since entrant's and USP's letters are substitutes in any given market. 
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In words, to obtain (2’) we have used the relationship between access 
prices and retail prices to express the optimal retail price as a function of its 
impact on the two final good markets. The effect of p on the quantity sold in 
each area is the sum of two effects: the usual direct effect of price on 
quantity, pqIj ∂∂ / , and an indirect effect through the quantity of the entrant. 
This second effect is the product of the effect of p on the entrant's quantity in 
the rural market, pqEj ∂∂ / , by the displacement ratio jσ . If we denote by 
 
j
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the total derivative of Ijq  with respect to p, we obtain the following formula 
for the optimal value of p 
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Equation (3) shows that the USP retail price is a weighted average of 
marginal costs in the urban and rural markets. The weights used are equal to 
the share of variation of quantity in one delivery area (when the letter price 
is changed) in the total variation in both areas. It is worth noting that weights 
are proportional to variation of quantities when the price changes, and not to 
the absolute value of quantities in the areas: it is not the size of the market 
that matters, but its sensitivity to variations in the letter price (the size of the 
market still plays a role in that weights are proportional to the derivatives of 
quantities, and not to elasticities). 
Observe that pqdpdq Ij
I
j ∂∂< // and thus that the optimal letter price 
formula puts less weight on area j when the entrant needs access to this 
market. The reason for this surprising result is the following. Increasing the 
USP letter price has two effects on the area j welfare, and they play in 
opposite directions. The first, direct, effect is to decrease the number of USP 
letters. The second effect is to increase the quantity of access demanded by 
the entrant. To link these variations in quantities to variations in welfare, 
note that the access charge formula implies that the rural access charge is 
larger than social cost if and only if the USP letter price is greater than total 
marginal cost for rural delivery. This implies that the two effects of 
increasing p on rural welfare go in opposite directions, or put differently that 
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the second effect partly compensates the first. With a second effect partly 
compensating the first, the difference between letter price and rural marginal 
cost is less costly for social welfare, and the optimal USP letter price puts 
less weight on rural marginal cost. 
  
We now turn to the case where 0>λ , i.e. where the USP profit 
constraint is binding at the optimum. The access pricing formula can be 
restated as  
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where Ejε is the (absolute value) of the direct price elasticity of the demand 
for entrant's letters addressed to area j. Formula (4) builds on (1’) and adds 
the usual Ramsey term as a mark-up, which is inversely proportional to the 
demand direct price elasticity. The intuition for this last term is that it is less 
costly in terms of welfare to raise prices on markets where the demand is 
less sensitive to price, i.e. where demand direct price elasticity is lower. 
 
The formula for the optimum USP retail price is more complicated and 
given by the following FOC 
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m  Equation (5) is constituted of three additive terms. The first two terms 
are similar: each is composed of the product of the derivative of USP’s 
quantity by p and of a price term. This price term is equal to p minus 
marginal cost in market j, augmented by a Ramsey term. One peculiarity of 
this expression is the use of the total derivative of Ijq  with respect to p in 
both the weight and in the computation of the elasticity 
)/)(/(ˆ Ij
I
j
I
j qpdpdq−=ε . As explained above, this is due to the fact that p 
affects Ijq  directly but also indirectly through its effect on 
E
jq .  
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The third term in the expression has the form of a Ramsey markup, with 
on each market a weight proportional to the derivative of the entrant's 
quantity by the USP's letter price. Observe also the absence of any marginal 
cost in this third term. The intuition for this formula goes as follows. When 
setting the optimal value of p, the USP takes into account its effect on its 
own final good markets (including the indirect effect through modifications 
in the entrant's quantity), but also on the entrant's final good markets, 
because the USP makes profit on these market by selling access to the 
entrant. As usual, the distortion (and thus the need to keep p as close to 
marginal cost as possible) is inversely proportional to the elasticity of 
demand. 
 
 Finally, our framework allows us to look for the optimal uniform 
access charge, in the case where the access charge cannot (for regulatory or 
practical reasons) be differentiated according to the final destination of the 
entrant's mail. In this case, we know from De Donder et al.(2003) that the 
optimal uniform access charge is a weighted average of the optimum 
differentiated access charges obtained above. The weight used for each 
market corresponds to the share of the variation of entrant's quantities in this 
market when the entrant's price increases in the total variation of entrant's 
quantities (in both markets) when the entrant's prices in both markets are 
increased. 
More precisely, introducing the new notation 
( ) ( ),//
/
E
R
E
R
E
U
E
U
E
U
E
U
pqpq
pq
∂∂+∂∂
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=α  
we obtain after simplification that the optimum uniform access charge is 
given by 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ).1 RIRIIRUIUIIU dcpddcpda σασα −−+−+−−+=   (6) 
 
in the case where λ=0, and by  
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if λ>0. 
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The expression for p is very complicated but basically boils down to a 
weighted sum of the marginal cost, augmented by a Ramsey term if λ>0, in 
both areas of delivery. 
 
The analytical results obtained in this section assume that the optimal 
access charge is lower than the entrant’s delivery cost. If this is not the case, 
the entrant does not ask for access and the precise value of the access charge 
is irrelevant. For instance, it may happen that this uniform access charge is 
greater than the entrant's delivery cost on one market, say the urban market. 
In this case, the entrant will not request access to the urban submarket and 
the optimal uniform access charge is computed with only the rural submarket 
in mind. In other terms, the uniform access charge will be given by the 
optimal rural access charge as computed in equations (1) and (2). The same 
access charge will be offered on both markets but the entrant will use its own 
delivery capability on the urban market rather than the USP’s network.  
The analytical approach developed here is based on first order conditions 
for optimality and does not allow the assessment of whether a constraint on 
an access charge is binding or not at the optimum nor the comparison of 
levels, particularly welfare levels, in the different cases. In order to get a 
better understanding of these elements, we make use of numerical 
simulations in the rest of this paper. We explain our calibration assumptions 
and give the results obtained in section 4. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Calibration and Reporting of Results 
 
Calibration data for the demand side are obtained from De Donder et al 
(2002a). More precisely, we take linear demands that we calibrate to obtain 
that the total quantity sold by the USP under monopoly at an assumed 
current price p of 0.35€ is 8 900 millions items for urban delivery and 1 100 
millions items for rural delivery. Both demand functions exhibit a direct 
price elasticity of –0.376 (obtained by averaging the elasticities on the 
households’ and firms’ markets in De Donder et al (2002a)) on both markets 
at the 0.35€ price. Regarding the costs, we assume that the collection plus 
transportation and sorting cost is Ic =0.1€ for the USP and Ec =0.13€ for the 
entrant. The delivery cost is IUd =0.07€ for the USP and 
E
Ud =0.12€ for the 
entrant on the urban market and, respectively, IRd =0.16€ and 
E
Rd =0.35€ on 
the rural market. The USP’s fixed cost F is 1 701 millions €. The reader can 
easily check that the letter business of the USP just covers its costs 
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(including the fixed cost) at the 0.35€ price before opening of the market to 
competition.5  
Results from the model using these calibration values are reported in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3. The column headed “monopoly” gives the results before 
the opening of the market to competition. Its main interest is in the value of 
the consumer surplus in the urban and rural areas6, which will be used as 
benchmark values. The remaining columns of Tables 1 and 3 report results 
from the model which highlight sensitivities relating to the extent and nature 
of entry and reflect the higher level of uncertainty relating to the value of 
these parameters. Two blocks of results are shown. Columns two and three 
are results for cases where the entrant would take a 10% share of each 
market if it were to post a price of 0.35€, the same as the uniform tariff set 
by the USP. The second block reports results for a value of 23.8% and so 
one where the underlying attractiveness of the entrant’s service is, for 
whatever reason, appreciably more than the first block.7 The second 
dimension highlighted in the results is the displacement ratio, σ.  This is set 
at two values:  σ=0.5 which implies that for every two items carried by the 
entrant, one is displaced from the USP and one is newly generated by the 
entrant’s service and σ= 0.75 where for every four items carried by the 
entrant, three are displaced from the USP and only one is new.8  
 
 
 
Optimal Access Charges and Uniform Retail Price when Bypass is 
not Allowed 
 
We first analyse the optimal differentiated access charges when the 
entrant does not have the availability to bypass the USP’s delivery network. 
The main consequence of this assumption is to lift the constraint that the 
optimum access charge has to be lower than the entrant’s delivery cost. In 
the case where λ =0, the optimal retail price p is given by equation (3) while  
                                                 
5 Note that for ease of presentation the “fixed cost” includes a normal rate of return 
on capital or accounting profit so that the USP breaks even after allowing for this 
return (see De Donder et al, 2002a). 
6 More precisely, it is the welfare that the representative consumer gets from sending 
letters to, respectively, urban and rural addressees. 
7 The value of 23.8% is taken from De Donder et al (2002a) and is the value 
obtained there where the market share for business senders is 25% and that of 
residential senders is 15%. The alternative value assumes that the combined figure is 
only 10%. 
8 We assume the same displacement ratio and market share in both the urban and 
rural areas. 
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optimal charges are given by equation (1’). Comparing the optimal pricing 
strategy under no bypass with the pre-liberalisation one, we obtain that both 
types of consumers (urban and rural) have a much higher consumer surplus 
after entry. The entrant breaks even, by definition of a competitive fringe. 
On the other hand, the USP makes a huge loss after entry. The reason for this 
loss is the following. With λ =0, we are in a first best setting, where the retail 
price p equals marginal cost (except for the fact it cannot differ in the urban 
and rural markets, so it is an average of marginal costs). Moreover, the 
ECPR-like formula for access charges perfectly compensates the incumbent 
for any end-to-end profit foregone due to access being provided. The USP 
then covers exactly its variable costs and its loss equals its fixed costs.9 
 
                                                 
9 This contrasts with De Donder et al (2003) where λ=0 allows the USP to break 
even. In that paper, the USP retail price p is held exogenously at the monopoly 
break-even price (0.35€) even after entry. Since the optimal access charge formula 
compensates the USP for the profit lost due to providing access, the USP still breaks 
even after liberalisation. 
 
Table 1: Optimal Access Charges and Retail Price – No bypass allowed 
  Monopoly   Entrant’s Market Share If It Set Prices at 0.35€  
     10%    23.8%1  
    σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75  σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 
Access Charges, €: Urban -  0.178 0.213  0.189 0.219 
 Rural -  0.217 0.232  0.228 0.238 
Entrant’s Prices, €:  Urban  -  0.308 0.343  0.319 0.349 
 Rural  -  0.347 0.362  0.359 0.368 
USP Retail Price  0.35  0.346 0.349  0.337 0.345 
Entrant’s  
Quantities, bn: 
Urban 
Rural 
- 
- 
 1.445 
0.118 
1.050 
0.078 
 2.716 
0.275 
2.193 
0.219 
USP Quantities2, bn: Urban  8.9  8.213 8.123  7.662 7.304 
 Rural  1.1  1.045 1.043  0.977 0.941 
USP Profit, bn €  0  0 0  0 0
Consumer Surplus, 
bn €: 
Urban 
Rural 
4.142 
0.512 
 4.257 
0.521 
4.178 
0.514 
4.544 
0.550 
4.298 
0.527 
Value of λ    0.217 0.221  0.200 0.214 
Total Welfare, bn €3  4.654  4.778 4.692  5.094 4.842 
Compared with 
Monopoly, bn € 
 -  0.124 0.038  0.440 0.170 
1. Weighted average of business and residential sender mail as calculated in De Donder et al (2002a).   
2. Additionally, the USP delivers all of the entrant’s mail so that the USP’s delivered volumes are higher in all cases 
than its monopoly quantities. 
3. Sum of consumer surplus and (1+ λ) USP profit. 
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The USP loss when λ=0 indicates that the USP profit constraint is 
binding at the optimum. We report in Table 1 the results obtained when the 
USP just breaks even and the value of λ (the Lagrange multiplier of this 
constraint is obtained endogenously when solving the regulator’s 
maximisation program. We first comment on the case where the market 
share of the entrant at a price equal to the USP equals 10% and where σ 
equals 0.5, before looking at the impact of modifying σ and the market share 
assumption. The endogenous value of λ is quite low at 0.217, showing that it 
is not very costly in terms of aggregate welfare to require the USP to break-
even in this case. This low value of λ feeds (through equations (4) and (5)) 
into relatively low values for p (0.346€) as well as the urban (0.178€) and 
the rural (0.217€) access charges. Observe that the value of the retail price is 
even lower than its monopoly level! This is due to the fact that the USP 
makes some profit on selling access to its competitors and so can decrease its 
final price while still breaking even. It is worth noting also that even though 
the USP’s end-to-end volume declines the total volume of mail it delivers (of 
this type and delivery of the entrant’s product) rises compared with the 
monopoly base case. 
With a lower USP retail price and access to the goods sold by the 
entrant, both categories of consumers benefit from the opening of the market 
to competition. Such a move then constitutes a Pareto improvement (with 
respect to the monopoly situation) since some actors are strictly better off 
(consumers) while no one is worse off (postal operators break-even). 
We now compare the results shown in the four columns of Table 1 to 
assess the impact of a higher displacement ratio σ and/or a higher entrant’s 
market share. First note that, in all cases, the value of λ is low, the USP retail 
price is lower than its monopoly level and the USP’s delivered volumes rise 
compared with the monopoly level. All consumers benefit from the opening 
of the market to competition which introduces a wider range of choice and 
leads to a more intensive use of the USP’s delivery network. All these results 
are thus robust to the modifications of parameter values shown in Table 1.  
As for the impact of the entrant’s market share, we see that a higher 
share leads to a small decrease in λ, and to small decreases in the USP retail 
price and access charges which in turn increase consumer welfare. These 
results may seem surprising at first sight and deserve an explanation. 
Increasing the entrant’s market share means increasing the desirability of the 
entrant’s product and increasing the total size of the postal market. The small 
decrease in USP retail price is not enough to prevent the USP retail 
quantities from falling. However, the USP compensates this loss in end-to-
end revenues by increasing its revenues from selling access to the entrant, 
since the entrant’s quantities roughly double with a higher market share and 
so increases the total volume of mail delivered by the USP jointly from its 
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own end-to-end service and delivery of the entrant’s product. The increase in 
the consumers’ surplus thus has two sources: the higher desirability of the 
entrant’s product associated with its higher market share and the (slightly) 
lower prices for both the USP and the entrant’s goods. 
A lower displacement ratio has the same (qualitative) effects than an 
increase in the entrant’s market share: a lower value of σ means that a higher 
proportion of the entrant’s volumes corresponds to a generation of postal 
volume and not simply replacement of USP’s by entrant’s volume. The same 
mechanisms as above then explain why higher volumes tend to lower prices 
and increase consumers’ welfare. 
To summarise, when bypass is not a possibility, setting the USP retail 
price and access charges at their optimal levels leads to increases in 
consumers’ welfare while allowing the USP to break-even. A higher 
entrant’s market share and lower displacement ratio raise the total volume of 
mail delivered by the USP, decrease prices and increase welfare.  
This appealing result incorporates within it the possibility for the USP to 
post access charges differentiated according to the delivery area. Such a 
differentiation may be technically cumbersome, legally prohibited or more 
simply may entail significant transaction costs for the USP. We now look at 
the consequences of imposing uniformity for the access charges as well as 
for the USP retail price in the case where bypass is not available to 
entrants10. Table 2 focuses on the no bypass case with σ=0.5 and the 
entrant’s market share at 23.8% and an endogenous value of λ. It compares 
the welfare maximising results obtained when the access charges may be 
differentiated according to the area (second column of figures) and where a 
uniform access charge must be posted (third column). The optimum value of 
the uniform access charge is given by equation (7). It is very close to the 
optimum urban access charge, since the weight put on this value (the 
parameter α in equation (7)) is equal to 0.89. We know from theory that 
imposing another constraint (uniformity of access charge) will make it more  
costly to raise money to cover the USP fixed costs. However, we see in 
Table 2 that the value of λ is barely affected by the uniformity constraint, 
and such is the case also for the USP retail price. The reason is that the rural 
market is sufficiently small not to matter much in these results. We also 
know from Section 3 that imposing the access charge to be uniform will 
increase the entrant’s urban price and decrease the entrant’s rural price. 
Since the USP price barely moves, this translates into a lower urban 
consumers’ surplus and a higher rural consumers’ surplus. Note that even 
with a uniform access charge (and USP retail price), all consumers have a 
                                                 
10 This case is similar to that in the US under “dropshipment” discounts (Cohen et al, 
2002). 
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higher welfare than under monopoly. Moreover, the net effect on total 
welfare compared with the case of differentiated access charges is only very 
slightly negative and this result is prior to the cost of a differentiation of 
access prices geographically. 
 
To summarise, the results obtained with differentiated access charges are 
robust to the introduction of a uniform access pricing constraint. In 
particular, the welfare gain from geographical de-averaging of the access 
price in this case is minimal for the parameters chosen. We obtain the same 
conclusion for the other cases of σ and market shares reported in Table 1. 
 
Optimal Access Charges and Uniform Retail Price with Bypass in 
Urban Area 
 
Unfortunately, these welfare-enhancing results do not carry through to 
the situation where bypass is available to the entrant. In all four cases 
reported in Table 1 as well as in Table 2, the urban access charge is higher 
Table 2: Optimal Uniform Access Charges and Retail Price – No Bypass 
      
    Access Charges 
      
  Monopoly  Differentiated Uniform 
      
Access Charges, €: Urban -  0.189 0.194 
 Rural -  0.228 0.194 
    
Entrant’s Prices, €:  Urban  -  0.319 0.324 
 Rural  -  0.359 0.324 
    
USP Retail Price  0.35  0.337 0.337 
    
Entrant’s  
Quantities1, bn: 
Urban  
Rural 
- 
- 
 2.716 
0.275 
2.662 
0.329 
    
USP Quantities, bn: Urban  8.9  7.662 7.689 
 Rural  1.1  0.977 0.950 
    
USP Profit, bn €  0  0 0
    
Consumer Surplus, 
bn €: 
Urban  
Rural 
4.142 
0.512 
 4.544 
0.550 
4.532 
0.560 
    
Value of λ    0.200 0.201 
    
Total Welfare, bn €2  4.654  5.094 5.093 
    
Compared with 
Monopoly, bn € 
 -  0.440 0.439 
     
1. Additionally, the USP delivers all of the entrant’s mail so that the USP’s delivered 
volumes are higher in all cases than in monopoly quantities. 
2. Sum of consumer surplus and (1+ λ) USP profit. 
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than the entrant’s delivery cost in the urban area (which is set at 0.12 €). 
Faced with this access charge, the entrant will deliver itself on the urban 
area. However, the entrant still asks for access to the rural area given that the 
rural access charge is in all cases lower than its rural delivery cost (set at 
0.35€). The rural access charge is also lower than the USP retail price, so 
that the entrant is not tempted to reinject its rural mail through the USP’s 
end-to-end network. 
In Table 3, we provide results where the entrant bypasses the USP 
delivery network in the urban area and uses it in the rural area.11 As for table 
1, we first discuss the results for the low entrant’s market share, low 
displacement ratio case before analysing the comparative static results with 
respect to these parameters. 
In stark contrast to De Donder et al.(2003), fixing simultaneously the 
rural access charge and the USP retail price makes it possible for this case 
for the USP to break even. On the other hand, the welfare cost for society of 
requiring the USP to break even is quite high, as shown by the high value of 
λ (0.511) at equilibrium. This value is much higher than the cost of public 
funds in developed countries, often put in the range of 0.2 to 0.3. This 
indicates that, from a solely welfarist viewpoint, the level of welfare would 
be higher if the USP were to run a deficit and to finance it via transfers from 
the State general budget. The reason why λ is so high, especially compared 
with the corresponding no bypass situation, is simply that the USP cannot 
earn money by providing access to the urban area so resulting in a decline in 
the volumes it handles through its delivery network.  This leads to the USP  
needing to raise its prices for both its final retail good and rural access. It 
turns out that the USP retail price (0.383€) and the entrant’s rural price 
(0.374€) are both greater than the USP pre-liberalisation price (0.35€). Both 
types of consumers suffer from these higher prices and end up with less 
surplus than under monopoly! Such a scenario constitutes a Pareto 
worsening move away from monopoly, since some groups are worse off 
(consumers) while no group is better off (the postal operators just break 
even). Such results illustrate the very significant impact potentially of 
allowing entrant bypass since adding this possibility turns a Pareto 
improvement into a Pareto worsening move!12 
                                                 
11 We assume that the USP is prevented by legal or regulatory constraints from 
“undercutting” the entrant’s urban delivery cost and so that urban bypass cannot be 
prevented. We then maintain the urban access charge at their Table 1 level, without 
any loss of generality. 
12 It is important to note that bypass is in itself socially inefficient in our setting 
since the entrant’s delivery cost is higher than the USP’s. A socially efficient bypass 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for bypass to be welfare improving. 
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The impact of bypass is even more visible when the value of the 
displacement ratio is higher at 0.75 because in such a case there are no 
values of the rural access charge and the USP retail price that enable the 
USP to break-even. The reason is straightforward: when the entrant mostly 
displaces volume from the USP, it prevents the USP from earning revenues 
on these volumes, except by selling access to the rural area, which is a small 
market compared to the urban one, and there is a significant fall in the total 
number of items the USP delivers through its delivery network. For a high 
enough value of the displacement ratio, breaking even is then not possible 
for the USP. 
In the case where σ=0.75, Table 3 reports the USP loss minimising 
solution, which formally corresponds to the case where λ is set at plus 
infinity in the regulator’s optimisation program. In such a case, all prices are 
higher than when σ=0.5, and surpluses are lower for both urban and rural 
consumers. It is difficult to give a value for total society’s welfare, since the 
 
Table 3: O ptim al Access Charges and Retail Price – Bypass Allow ed   
Case w here Entrant C hooses B ypass in Urban Area and Access in Rural Area 
         
  M onopoly   Entrant’s M arket Share If It Sets Prices at 0 .35€  
     10%     23.8% 1  
     
    σ  =  0.5 σ  = 0.75  σ  =  0.5 σ  =  0.75 
         
Access C harges, €: U rban2  -  0 .178 0.213  0.189 0.219 
 Rural3  -  0 .244 0.304  0.302 0.318 
Entrant’s Prices, €:  U rban  -  0 .250 0.250  0.250 0.250 
 Rural  -  0 .374 0.434  0.432 0.448 
U SP Retail Price  0 .35  0.383 0.429  0.415 0.407 
Entrant’s  
Q uantities, bn: 
U rban 
Rural 
- 
- 
 2 .419 
0.104 
4.392 
0.046 
 4.096 
0.220 
5.374 
0.129 
U SP Q uantities, bn: U rban  8.9  7 .379 4.851  6.227 4.323 
 Rural  1 .1  1 .009 0.972  0.913 0.936 
U SP Profit, bn €4  0   0  -0.274  0 -0.518 
Consum er Surplus, 
bn €: 
U rban 
Rural 
4.142 
0.512 
 4.087 
0.480 
3.911 
0.429 
 4.239 
0.458 
4.310 
0.454 
V alue of λ    0 .511 Infinite  0.841 Infinite
T otal W elfare, bn €5  4 .654  4.567 U ndefined6  4.697 U ndefined7
Compared with 
M onopoly, bn €8 
 -  -0.087 -0.670  0.042 -0.563 
         
1 . W eighted average o f business and residential sender mail as calculated  in De D onder et al (2002a) 
2 . Optimal charge is greater than entrant’s delivery cost per item of 0.12€ so entrant uses own delivery capability.   
3 . The rural access charge is the optim al uniform access charge given entrants deliver by their own network in the urban 
area.  
4 . Note that if the U SP had set an access charge between the entrant’s delivery cost per item of 0.12€ and its own 
delivery cost of 0 .07€ it would have been able to reduce its financial loss.  
5 . Sum of consumer surplus and (1+ λ) U SP  profit. 
6 . Undefined because λ  is infinite.  If, in this case, the loss-minimising profit of –0.274bn€ were to be funded by some 
distortionary m eans, such as taxation, at a value of λ=0.3  then total welfare would be 3 .984 bn€. 
7 . See footnote 6.  Total welfare of 4.091 bn€ if the loss minimising profit of –0.518 bn€ were funded at a value of 
λ=0.3. 
8 . Cases where break-even is not possible expressed against case where remaining loss is funded at λ=0.3 (see footnotes 
6, 7). 
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value of λ is infinite. Observe nevertheless that the sum of USP loss and 
consumers’ surpluses is lower than under monopoly, since all three actors 
are worse off. But taking a simple sum overestimates total welfare, since it 
implies that there is no welfare cost in transferring money to cover the USP 
loss. A more reasonable assumption is that this loss would have to be funded 
by some form of distortionary means such as taxation. Using a value of 0.3 
for the welfare cost associated with this transfer, we report results on this 
basis in Table 3 and obtain that total welfare is lower than the monopoly 
level by 670 millions € in the (σ=0.75, 10% entrant’s market share) case and 
by 563 millions € in the (σ=0.75, 23.8% entrant’s market share) case. 
As for the impact of a higher entrant’s market share, we obtain that 
although it increases all prices, it increases consumers’ surpluses in both the 
urban and rural (except when σ=0.5) areas. The reason for this result is that 
increasing the entrant’s market share means that consumers derive more 
utility from the good provided by the entrant. This effect is stronger than the 
negative effect of higher prices (except for rural consumers when σ=0.5). 
 As a consequence, the only case where total welfare is (very slightly) 
higher than under monopoly is when the displacement rate is low and the 
entrant’s market share high. Even in this case, there is no Pareto 
improvement, since rural consumers are worse off. For the three other cases, 
both types of consumers are worse off. 
 
5. EXTENSIONS TO THE MODEL AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of our paper has been to gain insights for the formulation of 
rules in the setting of optimal or welfare-maximising access charges to the 
delivery network of a universal service provider (USP). The USP provides 
universal postal service at a uniform tariff. Our analytical model allows for 
the possibility of bypass by entrants and this has significant impacts which 
we have illustrated through numerical results from calibrations of the model. 
However, the conclusions we draw from our results are preliminary.  A 
number of the extensions to the model are desirable. These include 
incorporating the possibility of direct access by private customers to the 
USP’s network as required by the 2002 EU Postal Directive13 and the case 
                                                 
13 Official Journal, L176/21, 2002. Article 12. The full text reads:  
“whenever universal service providers apply special tariffs, for example for services 
for business, bulk mailers or consolidators of mail from different customers, they 
shall apply the principles of transparency and non-discrimination with regard both to 
the tariffs and to the associated conditions. The tariffs shall take account of the 
avoided costs, as compared to the standard service covering the complete range of 
features offered for the clearance, transport, sorting and delivery of individual postal 
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where the entrant has some degree of market power instead of a competitive 
fringe which sets a price equal to its marginal cost. These developments 
were discussed in De Donder et al (2003) and further work on these 
extensions is in progress. 
Our first conclusion is one we drew first in De Donder et al (2003) but 
which is reaffirmed and expanded by the more general model we have 
presented in the current paper. This is that optimal access charges follow the 
efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) 14 but modified to take account of at 
least two main factors which are both related to the effects of entry. The first 
of these is a reduction below this price to take account of the displacement 
ratio. More specifically, this reduction is directly related to the extent to 
which entrants’ traffic is newly generated rather than displacing the USP’s 
existing traffic. However, a second modification is an increase in the access 
charge which depends on the size of the financial loss the USP incurs 
following entry. This loss will arise if entry through bypass takes place in 
other parts of the USP’s network. Which of these two opposing effects 
would be larger and hence whether the optimal access charge is above or 
below ECPR depends on a number of factors and, in particular, on the extent 
of entry through bypass. The current paper has extended the previous results 
to allow for the uniform retail price of the USP to be set optimally as well 
and has shown how this also impacts on optimal access charges. 
This leads to a second important conclusion which again both reaffirms 
and expands that set out in De Donder et al (2003). The optimal access 
charge as developed through models of this type might be above the cost of 
entrants using their own networks to deliver mail. The resulting entry 
through bypass will lead to a financial loss by the USP and, even where 
some form of funding can be found to cover this deficit, the effect on total 
welfare of access depends on specific circumstances. In the calibration 
model, we explore this through the use of a range of parameter values and 
find that welfare will tend to increase the greater the underlying 
attractiveness of entrants’ services and the more the traffic they carry is 
newly generated. Conversely, if entrants’ services would take a small share 
                                                                                                                   
items and, together with the associated conditions, shall apply equally both as 
between different third parties and as between third parties and universal service 
providers supplying equivalent services. Any such tariffs shall also be available to 
private customers who post under similar conditions” 
14 To be clear we use the term ECPR where the value of the displacement ratio, σ, is 
equal to 1. Armstrong (2002) uses the term ‘margin rule’ for this case and the term 
ECPR for the more general case where the price is inclusive of σ in the interval 0 to 
1. 
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of the market at an equal price to the USP’s and custom gained would be 
largely through the displacement of the USP’s traffic then access would tend 
to have a negative effect on total welfare. By contrast, we show also that 
where access is permitted but bypass is not, pricing on the basis of ECPR 
(adjusted to take account of displacement effects) not only allows the USP to 
break-even but also that welfare is higher than under monopoly without 
access.  
To these original, preliminary conclusions we now add a third.  This is 
that the optimal uniform retail price tends to be higher in the cases where 
bypass occurs and the total volume of mail delivered by the USP falls 
compared with the position under monopoly. However, the optimal uniform 
retail price is lower where entrants can provide service only through access 
and the total volume of mail delivered by the USP rises compared with the 
position under monopoly. Underlying this difference is recovery of the fixed 
cost of the delivery network - with entrant bypass there are fewer items of 
mail compared with the monopoly base but with access only there are more 
items from which to recover the fixed cost. In turn, this difference impacts 
on the optimal access charges compared with those calculated under the 
original, uniform retail price under monopoly and tends to increase them 
where bypass occurs and reduce them where entry is by access only. 
Our conclusions from the paper indicate then that optimal access charges 
are ECPR in form but adjusted for the nature and overall level of entry and 
the optimal uniform retail tariff. In setting access charges this would require 
a regulator to allow for the effect of entry and the charges are more complex 
in the case where entry can be either by access or bypass rather than by 
access alone. In practice, it is difficult to see how these rules could be made 
fully operational but they support strongly the position that is held widely in 
postal economics that where regulators require unbundled access to the 
USP’s network ECPR is the appropriate starting point for the setting of 
access charges. That position is reflected in article 12 of the 2002 EU Postal 
Directive. The extent to which that rule might be varied up or down would 
need to allow explicitly for an assessment of entry into the postal market, a 
conclusion which is reinforced by the more general model presented in this 
paper.   
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